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I. INTRODUCTION
We stand in an era of psychological evolution. This develop-
ment of perception and thought includes a shift from the desire to
dominate our surroundings towards the desire to accommodate
them. Cultural imperatives based on fear of the wild once dictated
that "[i]f men expected to enjoy an idyllic environment . . . they
would have to make it by conquering wild country."1 Contrarily,
the realization that "man has become the greatest threat to his
1. R. NASH, WnDoREss AND THE AMERICAN MIND 26 (3d ed. 1982) (tracing the develop-
ment of American sentiment regarding wilderness and the environment).
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own survival and development"' colors most contemporary envi-
ronmental theory with refreshing hues of human restraint.3 Cer-
tainly, then, popular perceptions of the environment have matured
since the time when Lewis Cass, a Michigan soldier and Senator,
declared: "[tihere can be no doubt that the Creator intended the
earth should be reclaimed from a state of nature and cultivated.""
On September 16, 1987, by adopting the Montreal Protocol on
Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer (the "Montreal Proto-
col" or the "Protocol"),5 the international community added an-
other multilateral agreement to the growing number of interna-
tional documents which manifest this change in the approach to
global environmental problems. The Montreal Protocol seeks to
protect our ecosystem from the effects of ozone depletion by call-
2. L. CALDWELL, IN DEFENSE OF EARTH 225 (1972) (setting forth the paradox that man is
the most serious threat to his own existence).
3. See generally id. Existentialist philosopher and playwright Jean Paul Sartre ex-
pounded on this same view in a broader sense. In his play, The Condemned of Altona,
Sartre delivered his version of the verdict of history through his character Franz. Franz
stated, "The century might have been a good one had not man been watched from time
immemorial by the cruel enemy who had sworn to destroy him, that hairless, evil, flesh-
eating beast-man himself." J. SARTu, THE CONDEMNED OF ALTONA 177 (S. Leeson & G.
Leeson trans. 1960).
4. Cass, Removal of the Indians, 30 N. Am. REV. 62, 77 (1830). A statement made dur-
ing the same year by Georgia Governor George R. Gilmer perhaps more accurately reflects
the attitude that wilderness was ripe for exploitation. He justified this domineering attitude
by citing the "command of the Creator, delivered to man upon his formation-be fruitful,
multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it." R. NASH, supra note 1, at 31. Some cur-
rent commentators reflect this view. According to one, everything good depends on beating
back and holding at bay the wilderness both in nature and the human heart. Wernick,
Speaking Out: Let's Spoil the Wilderness, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Nov. 6, 1965, at 12. See
also A MAY, VOicE IN THE WI.DENESS (1978) in which the author writes about the wilder-
ness movement and wilderness organizations as well as what the author deems "the gro-
tesque irony of wilderness being destroyed by its own protection." Id. at 1.
Nothing inherent in the development of civilization required such an exploitative atti-
tude. For example, the Chinese Taoists, drawing on their agrarian history, idealize nature,
and by extension, the environment. For Taoists, nature is the source of all human happi-
ness, while man is the source of all human suffering. FUNO Yu LAN, A SHORT HISTORY OF
CHINESE PHILOSOPHY 20-21 (1948).
5. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, re-
printed in 26 I.L.M. 1550 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. The Montreal Protocol seeks to
regulate the production and consumption of chemicals which decimate the ozone layer. The
following forty-seven countries signed the Final Act of the Montreal Protocol: Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Bylorussian SSR, Canada, Chile, China,
Congo, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland,
France, Ghana, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Ko-
rea, Senegal, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, and the European Economic
Community.
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ing for global regulation of the chemicals which decimate the ozone
and expose our delicate environment to harmful solar radiation.
This article analyzes the Protocol and its potential for success.
Part II sets forth basic scientific information required to under-
stand the nature of the crisis and briefly explains the crucial provi-
sions of the Protocol. Part III addresses the quintessential problem
of all international agreements, namely, enforcement. It is argued
here that the economic and political consequences of the Protocol
leave the current version of the agreement unenforceable. How-
ever, as a deeper reflection of our developing environmental con-
sciousness, this article suggests the recategorization of the ozone
crisis as a moral rather than economic problem. Once cast as a
moral issue, the international community may more willingly seek
criminal instead of economic enforcement means. Finally, this arti-
cle concludes that with the continuing maturation of our environ-
mental psychology, the global community may effectively enforce
international environmental law with criminal sanctions based
upon moral imperatives, rather than with fiscal incentives based
upon economic power.
I. THE CRISIS AND CURRENT RESPONSE TO THE OZONE DEPLETION
PROBLEM
A proper understanding of the Protocol and its limitations re-
quires a brief investigation into the scientific information which
precipitated the agreement. To this end, the first part of this sec-
tion explains the function and composition of the ozone layer and
discusses the probable causes and effects of its diminution. Follow-
ing this discussion, the second part of this section sets forth the
current response to the ozone depletion crisis by redacting key por-
tions of the Montreal Protocol.
A. The Ozone Crisis
Ozone (03) refers to unstable three part oxygen molecules, 7
which comprise a deep, though sparse, belt of atmospheric gas.'
6. Id. at 1551.
7. See Johnston, Systemic Environmental Damage: The Challenge to International
Law and Organization, 12 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 255, 263 (1985); Comment, The
Problem of Ozone Depletion-Is There an International Legal Solution?, 12 N.C.J. ImT'L L.
& Com. REG. 433, 434 (1987).
8. Comment, The Montreal Protocol: Confronting the Threat to Earth's Ozone Layer,
1990]
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Ozone is perhaps the most important trace constituent of the strat-
osphere,9 for it is responsible for shielding the earth from harmful
solar ultraviolet radiation.10 As the ozone layer diminishes, greater
concentrations of damaging radiation reach the earth's surface."
Until recently, scientists based fears of ozone layer destruction
more upon theoretical predictions than upon exacting observa-
tions. 2 However, the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion's (NASA) deployment of sophisticated satellites partially con-
firmed the scientists' theoretical forecasts.' Analysis of data
collected from the NASA satellites indicated global ozone de-
creased approximately 0.15 percent each year from 1970 to 1981,
an -annual ozone depletion of 0.5 percent between 1978 to 1984,
and seasonal depletion in some areas (especially Antarctica) as
high as sixty percent.'" Information collected by field scientists in
Switzerland, Germany, Canada, and Antarctica supports the satel-
lite data."' Additionally, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) compiled and synthesized available ozone
information and calculated that during the first half of 1983 ozone
concentrations over the Northern Hemisphere dropped between
five and seven percent.' 6 Now, with the revelation of this evidence,
scientists, policy makers, and even industrialists agree that the
ozone buffer is rapidly weakening due to increased concentrations
of chlorofluorocarbons in the atmosphere.1
7
63 WASH. L. REv. 997, 997 (1988) [hereinafter Confronting the Threat]. To be more precise,
ozone is present from the tioposphere (roughly ground level to 10 miles above the earth's
surface) to the outer limit of the stratosphere (approximately 30 miles above the earth's
surface). Comment, supra note 7.
9. Johnston, supra note 7.
10. Monastersky, Decline of the CFC Empire, Sci. NEws, Apr. 9, 1988, at 234; John-
ston, supra note 7; Confronting the Threat, supra note 8.
11. Shabecoff, Study Shows Significant Decline in Ozone Layer, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16,
1988, at A25, col. 1.
12. See Comment, supra note 7; Weisburd, Stratospheric Ozone: A New Policy Tone,
ScL NEws, June 18, 1986, at 404. For a discussion tracing ozone observation methodologies,
see Brodeur, Annals of Chemistry: In the Face of Doubt, NEw YoEKi.m, June 9, 1986, at 71-
72.
13. The theories were only partially confirmed because they correctly forecasted ozone
depletion. Unfortunately, the data from the Nimbus-4 and Nimbus-7 satellites evinced a far
more rapid and severe depletion than scientists presaged. See Comment, supra note 7, at
434-35.
14. Comment, supra note 7, at 434-35.
15. See Brodeur, supra note 12, at 70-72.
16. Brodeur, supra note 12, at 82.
17. Monastersky, supra note 10. According to Monastersky, DuPont, the world's lead-
ing producer of ozone-harming chemicals, agreed with an international panel of scientists
that the global ozone layer was disappearing at an unexpectedly fast rate. As a result, Du-
[Vol. 21:3
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1. The Causes of Ozone Depletion
Approximately seventy percent of ozone destruction is attribu-
table to a natural catalytic cycle involving nitric oxide and nitric
dioxide. 8 Scientists ascribe the remaining thirty percent impair-
ment to human activities, including consumption of versatile in-
dustrial chemicals known as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)."9 Produc-
tion and consumption of these compounds cause massive
quantities of CFCs to enter the atmosphere.2 0
Once in the atmosphere, shortwave radiation from the sun
breaks chlorine atoms away from the CFC molecules. 1 Free chlo-
rine atoms react with unstable ozone molecule, attracting ozone's
third oxygen atom, decomposing the ozone molecule into a more
stable, though less protective, common oxygen (02) molecule and a
chlorine monoxide radical (CO). 2 2 When the molecule of chlorine
Pont shocked industry when it jumped on "the environmental bandwagon" announcing its
support for plans to strengthen the Montreal Protocol and calling for a total world-wide ban
on production of chemicals harmful to the ozone layer. Id.
The DuPont position, which represents industry's recognition of ozone dissipation, un-
derscores the severity of the ozone problem especially given industry's general refusal to
alter its lobbying position against regulation of ozone-harming chemicals without absolute
proof of the deterioration and absolute proof of the causal connection between the chemi-
cals and the ozone dissolution. Brodeur, supra note 12, at 83; Hoppe, Ozone: Industry is
Getting its Head Out of the Clouds, Bus. Wy-, Oct. 13, 1986, at 110.
It should be noted that a small fringe of the scientific community remains unpersuaded
by the new evidence of ozone depletion. This intransigence stems from a perceived inability
to mesh the ozone deterioration theory with current knowledge of the ozone layer. Specifi-
cally, dissenters call attention to the equilibrium nature of ozone in the layer. They postu-
late that the amount of ozone in the atmosphere depends on a balance between the
processes of natural ozone production and destruction (through the short wavelengths of
ultraviolet light from the sun). This balance varies markedly over the globe and throughout
the year. Pease, Ozone Chicken Littles Are at It Again, Wall St. J., Mar. 23, 1989, at A24,
col. 15.
18. Johnston, supra note 7, at 263.
19. Comment, supra note 7, at 436-38; accord Naj, Chemical Reaction Helps to Ex-
plain Ozone Depletion, Wall St. J., Apr. 12, 1989, at B4, col. 3; Confronting the Threat,
supra note 8, at 997-1000. Specific chemicals targeted by the Montreal Protocol as most
harmful to the ozone are the following CFCs and halons: CFC13 (CFC-11), CF 2 CI2 (CFC-
12), C2 F3 C13 (CFC-113), C2 F4 C12 (CFC-114), C2 F5 CI (CFC-115), CF 2 BrCI (halon-1211),
CF 3Br (halon-1301), and C2 F4 Br2 (halon-2402). Montreal Protocol, supra note 5, annex A.
20. In fact, more than 35 million tons of CFCs currently circulate in the atmosphere.
UMTED NA7TONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, 1 N. AM. N.ws 2 (Dec. 1986); see also Com-
ment, The Montreal Protocol: Confronting the Threat to the Earth's Ozone Layer, 63
WASH. L. REv. 997, 999 n.17 (1988).
21. The process by which short wavelength ultraviolet light from the sun decomposes
CFC (as well as any other molecule) is scientifically termed photolysis. See Brodeur, supra
note 12, at 72.
22. Lemonick, The Heat is On, T mE, Oct. 19, 1987, at 58, 60.
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
monoxide confronts a free oxygen atom, a new oxygen molecule
(02) and a chlorine radical (Cl) are formed. This process triggers a
chain reaction in which one free chlorine atom and the numerous
reactions it catalyzes can destroy 100,000 ozone molecules.2 Thus,
the annual release of approximately one million tons of CFCs into
the atmosphere, in conjunction with the enormous destructive ca-
pacity of each chlorine atom, accounts in large part for most global
ozone depletion.
CFCs have permeated almost all aspects of modern life. De-
spite their adverse environmental effects, CFCs are industrially
ideal because they are nontoxic, nonflammable, versatile, and eco-
nomical chemicals. " They are commonly employed in the manu-
facture of foams, coolants, packaging, insulation, and propellants.
2 6
In the United States alone, more than $135 billion worth of prod-
ucts rely, in one form or another, on chlorofluorocarbons.2" The
production of this large volume of goods relying on CFCs effec-
tively has created a society dependent upon the availability of
CFCs. Yet, with the realization that CFCs destroy ozone, industrial
scientists quickly emphasized the nonexistence of any chemical
which could replace CFCs in the market.2 7 While large corpora-
tions throughout the world frantically invested millions in research
and development for substitute chemicals,2 8 an inexpensive alter-
native to CFCs remains undiscovered.
2. The Effects of Ozone Depletion
In truth, the process of ozone destruction poses a cataclysmic
23. Confronting the Threat, supra note 8, at 1000. The ability of CFCs to travel enor-
mous distances in the atmosphere highlights the international aspect of the ozone crisis. As
one noted professor of atmospheric chemistry, F. Sherwood Rowland, stated:
chlorofluorocarbon molecules, no matter where they are released, disperse very
quickly throughout the atmosphere, and that emission in Europe, say, will sweep
across Asia and the Pacific and reach the California coast in about a month ...
The damage now being inflicted upon the ozone layer above the United States
... is cumulative damage caused by chlorofluorocarbons that have been re-
leased throughout the world.
Brodeur, supra note 12, at 80.
24. Koenig, Search for Substitutes for Refrigerants Shows Some Progress but Has Far
to Go, Wall St. J., Mar. 28, 1988, at 6A, col. 1.
25. For a useful chart listing the most widely used CFCs and halons, their ozone deple-
tion potential, and U.S. and worldwide uses, see Monastersky, supra note 10, at 235.
26. Confronting the Threat, supra note 8, at 999.
27. Id.
28. Hoppe, supra note 17, at 111.
[Vol. 21:3
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threat to all nations. The potential effects of ozone depletion and
the concomitant exposure to higher concentrations of ultraviolet
radiation range from minor eye injury to a diminished global food
supply.2 As a result, the health of humans will most certainly feel
harsh immediate consequences. For example, increased exposure to
radiation will result in approximately 153 million more non-mela-
noma skin cancer cases among people alive today or born prior to
2075.80 Further, the increased UV-B radiation may impair human
immune systems, thus weakening the capacity to fight disease."'
Famine caused by crop and animal exposure to higher concen-
trations of radiation will exacerbate these human health problems.
As early as 1976, even before accurate data regarding the scope
and extent of damage to the ozone, the National Academy of Sci-
ences warned that the higher concentrations of solar radiation
reaching earth's surface could have devastating consequences for
the world's food supply by lowering crop yields and destroying mi-
croorganisms that form the foundation of the food chain.32 The
Academy's conclusion is buttressed by data regarding the known
vulnerability to ultraviolet radiation of approximately seventy-five
percent of the 200 major food crops,33 and almost all species of
marine microorganisms.84 Finally, the vulnerable plankton popula-
tion plays an important role in regulating climactic change by con-
verting carbon dioxide. The devastating effects of increased radia-
tion on these microorganisms caused by ozone depletion accounts
for thirty percent of the greenhouse effect.36
29. Confronting the Threat, supra note 8, at 998-1001; Comment, supra note 7, at 439.
30. Environmental Protection Agency, Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 52 Fed. Reg.
47,289, 47,494 (1987) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 82.1-.20 (1989)). Indeed, about 3 million of
these cases could be fatal. Id. See also Beck & Hager, More Bad News for the Planet: A
Grim Report on the Ozone, NEwSWEEK, Mar. 28, 1988, at 63.
31. Confronting the Threat, supra note 8, at 998 n.8.
32. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES. OZONE AND OTHER PHOTOCHEICAL OXIDANTS
(1977); Brodeur, supra note 12, at 76.
33. Hoppe, supra note 17, at 114; Comment, supra note 7, at 439.
34. Many commercially and nutritionally important species of marine life, such as
shrimp and crab, develop from these vulnerable microorganisms. The increased exposure to
ultraviolet radiation allowed by diminishing ozone concentration could directly remove
these species from the human diet (and the diet of other species) by killing them in their
larval state. Moreover, when radiation eradicates a species at the bottom of the food chain,
species higher in the food web have nothing upon which to feed. Thus, destruction of the
microorganisms, while not immediately detrimental to human health, would have dire con-
sequences when the fish, so vital a human food source, perish.
35. See Nightline: The London Conference on Ozone Depletion (ABC television broad-
cast, Mar. 7, 1987). For an overview of scientists' views that the forecasts of global warming
are exaggerated and computer models on which they are based are flawed, see Stevens,
1990]
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B. The Current International Response to the Ozone Crisis
To date, the Montreal Protocol represents the international
community's firmest reaction to the growing concern over the deci-
mation of the ozone layer.36 Analysis of the Protocol reveals a four-
pronged approach to ozone protection. Primarily, the Protocol re-
quires parties to freeze, and eventually reduce, production and
consumption of CFCs. 7 Article 2 of the Protocol sets forth the
control measures on production and consumption contemplated by
the parties.38 It calls for an immediate freeze, and provides a
schedule for the reduction, aiming for a fifty percent abatement in
consumption by 1999.1' However, each section of the Article 2
schedule contains a clause allowing up to ten percent annual in-
creases of production, based on the 1986 level, for "basic domestic
needs" and "industrial rationalization.""
Second, in order that these control measures accurately reflect
the seriousness of the crisis, Article 6 of the Protocol provides for
Skeptics are Challenging Dire 'Greenhouse' Views, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
36. Negotiations for international ozone protection commenced in 1981 under the aus-
pices of the United Nations Environment Programme. Confronting the Threat, supra note
8, at 1002. As a result, on March 22, 1985 twenty-one countries and the European Economic
Community adopted the Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer in Vienna, Aus-
tria. The United States ratified the Convention in August, 1986. See SEN. TREATY Doc. No.
100-10 (1986)[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The Vienna Convention provided the frame-
work for further negotiations including international cooperation in ozone research and the
adoption of international regulatory measures of substances detrimental to the ozone layer.
Confronting the Threat, supra note 8, at 1002. The Montreal Protocol, signed by 47 partici-
pants including many less developed countries, is an embodiment of the principles set forth
in the Vienna Convention. The Resolution on the Montreal Protocol, which was appended
to the Final Act, specifically recalled the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer and bore in mind the Resolution of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Pro-
tection of the Ozone Layer which beseeched "all States and regional economic integration
organizations, pending entry into force of a protocol, to control their emissions of CFCs,
inter alia in aerosols, by any means at their disposal, including controls on production or
use, to the maximum extent possible." Resolution on the Montreal Protocol, reprinted in 26
I.L.M. 1547 (1987).
37. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 5, art. 2.
38. Id.
39. Id. para. 4.
40. Id. art. 2. The Protocol defines "industrial rationalization" as "the transfer of all or
a portion of the calculated level of production of one Party to another, for the purpose of
achieving economic efficiencies or responding to anticipated shortfalls in supply as a result
of plant closures." Id. art. 1, par. 8. A definition of "domestic needs," however, remains
conspicuously absent from the Protocol. Thus, the very terms of the Protocol provide a
convenient loophole to escape the consequences of non-compliance. Of course, the drafters
of the agreement may have intentionally framed the control provisions in ambiguous terms
in order to entice more sovereign countries to join.
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periodic reassessment of the control measures provided for in Arti-
cle 2 using available scientific, environmental, technical, and eco-
nomic information, beginning in 1990 and at least every four years
thereafter.' This article calls for the parties to convene panels of
experts at least one year before each assessment. Further, within
one year of being convened, the panels will report their findings
through the Secretariat to the parties.2 Based on these assess-
ments, the parties will renegotiate control measures, adjusting
levels of production and consumption and adding new substances
to the list of chemicals regulated by the Protocol.
Third, recognizing the "special situation of developing coun-
tries,' '4. the Protocol entitles less developed countries to a ten year
delayed compliance with the control measures in Paragraphs 1 to 4
of Article 2 in order to meet their basic domestic needs. 4" More-
over, the Protocol requires the parties to the Protocol that are the
more developed countries to offer assistance and access to less de-
veloped countries in finding and implementing alternative sub-
stances and technologies." The terms of the agreement suggest
that much of this assistance take the form of special incentives
from the developed countries (bilaterally and multilaterally), in-
cluding subsidies, aid, credits, guarantees, and insurance policies."'
Finally, in order to encourage more countries to sign the
agreement, the Protocol imposes restrictions on trade of ozone-de-
pleting products.4 7 The agreement bans imports of CFCs from any
state not party to the Protocol.4 8 No party operating under Para-
graph 1 of Article 5 may export CFCs to non-parties beginning
January 1, 1993." Moreover, the Protocol allows objecting parties
to escape the ban on imports of products later found to be detri-
mental to the ozone.50
41. Id. art. 2.
42. Id. art. 6.
43. Id. art. 5.
44. Id. art. 5, para. 1. The special provisions for developing countries reflect the broad
international consensus that less developed countries deserve the benefits of consumer items
and industrial processes which currently require CFCs. Confronting the Threat, supra note
8, at 1005.
45. Montreal Protocol, supra note 5, art. 5, para. 2.
46. Id. art. 5, para. 3; see also id. art. 10 (technical assistance provision).
47. Id. art. 4.
48. Id. art. 4, para. 1.
49. Id. art. 4, para. 2.
50. While the language of the Protocol does not include products later found to be
detrimental to the ozone, the authors contend that this escape is possible. Cf. id. art. 4,
1990]
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Additional provisions regarding the reporting of production
and consumption data by parties to the Secretariat,"' and research,
development, public awareness, and exchange of information struc-
ture the Protocol's four step approach to CFC regulation." Most
notably, Article 9 prescribes international cooperation in promot-
ing public awareness of the environmental effects of the emissions
of controlled substances and other substances that deplete the
ozone layer. 53 The remaining portions of the Protocol deal with ad-
ministration of the agreement." Finally, it should be observed that
while the agreement contains an article titled "Non-compliance," 5
this clause remains without substantive meaning. It provides only
that "[t]he Parties at their first meeting, shall consider and ap-
prove procedures and institutional mechanisms for determining
non-compliance with the provisions of this Protocol and for treat-
ment of Parties found to be in non-compliance." ' This article
demonstrates the Protocol's lack of enforcement potential. Proba-
bly few parties will comply when faced with the loose terms of an
agreement devoid of coercive capacity.
By enacting the Protocol, the international community took
affirmative steps toward protecting the ozone. The Parties based
this protection on regulation of the consumption, production and
trade of chemicals known to decimate the ozone layer.
III. ENFORCEMENT OF OZONE PROTECTION MEASURES
The quintessential question of all international agreements
centers on enforcement. The Montreal Protocol, and more broadly,
all international environmental agreements are no different. It is
questionable whether the Protocol can be enforced in a world of
sovereign states empowered and intent to act for their own welfare
para. 3. According to this paragraph, parties which have not objected to the list of chemicals
found to decimate the ozone layer shall ban, within one year, the import of the those prod-
ucts from any state not a party to the Protocol.
51. Id. art. 9.
52. Id. art. 9, para. 2. Article 9 states that parties shall cooperate, "consistent with their
national laws, regulations and practices . . . in promoting, directly or through competent
international bodies, research, development and exchange of information" relating to best
technologies, alternative substances, products containing controlled substances, and prod-
ucts manufactured with them, and the costs and benefits of relevant control strategies. Id.
53. Id.
54. See generally id. arts. 11-20.
55. Id. art. 8.
56. Id.
[Vol. 21:3
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rather than for the benefit of the international community. This
discussion requires a brief analysis of the inherent interconnection
between environment, economics, and politics. Further, it demands
analysis of the Protocol within this framework. 7 The second part
of this section suggests that the world community may eventually e
more effectively enforce the Protocol and other environmental
agreements by altering the approach to environmental protection
from economic incentive to moral imperative. Commonly accepted
notions regarding the origins and enforceability of laws generally,
and evidence of a potential global change in attitude towards the
environment form the foundation of this recommendation.
A. Environmental Econo-Politics
Earth is a finite globe. The constituents of any finite object are
by definition finite as well. And so it is with the natural resources
which comprise this planet: they have limits. Over the millennia,
people pierced the delusion that Earth provides infinite resources
free for exploitation by all.59 Most people now realize that "Space-
ship Earth" 0 cannot provide inexhaustible coffers of resources for
human use.
Awareness that the environment provides limited resources
causes groups to attribute value to these resources. The attribution
57. Application of the principles of interconnection to the terms of the Protocol sup-
ports the conclusion that the economic and political consequences of CFC regulation may
well allow some states to breach the agreement with relative impunity. The term "relative"
is especially important to this portion of the argument. As will be argued later, econo-polit-
ices is about the allocation of scarce resources. While under the Protocol, a breaching state
may suffer some economic consequences from the complying portion of the international
community, the relative impunity of breach arises from the greater economic benefit to the
country derived from breaching than the detriment suffered under international pressure.
58. "Eventuality" is another important limiting aspect of this thesis. The moralistic
approach suggests not that objective Kantian moral imperatives will immediately strengthen
the Protocol, but rather only describes a process through which greater international envi-
ronmental protection may be gained by the necessarily slow alteration of attitudes towards
our environment. See generally I. KANr, ETHIcAL PHILOSOPHY (J. Ellington trans. 1983).
59. For example, 14th century London suffered such an extraordinary smog and soot
problem that definite limits were set on the free exploitation of air. "Feelings ran so high on
the subject ... that a man was hanged for burning smoky coal." A. COTrELL, ENVIaON N-
TAL Ecosomics 1 (1978).
60. "Spaceship Earth" is a popular extension of the Malthusian lifeboat dilemma, al-
though environmental economist Kenneth Boulding is first credited with coining the term.
Malthus argued that the world was incapable of sustaining an exponentially increasing pop-
ulation growth rate. To highlight the point, he analogized earth to a lifeboat capable of
safely holding two passengers. Picking other victims of a maritime catastrophe from the
water might well sink the boat and cause all to perish. Cf. L. CALDwmL, supra note 2, at 230.
1990]
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of value summons the discipline of economics into the study of en-
vironmental problems. Economics is often defined as "the science
which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and
scarce means which have alternative uses." ' Thus, one may view
economics as a social system for the distribution of resources to
which different groups ascribe different values. The general ques-
tion of how society allocates resources based on the value of each
resource to a particular group is the juncture where economics
joins the environmental and resource sciences."
Similarly, politics, in common definitionsas and used in ordi-
nary language 64 inherently includes the question of allocating
scarce resources. Statesmen constantly face the dilemma of effi-
ciently and justly apportioning insufficient resources in a world of
rising demands.65 In the political context, however, the question is
considered in terms of public administration rather than private
value. In other words, allocation depends not upon who values the
resource more, but upon which use of the resource most advanta-
geously benefits the community.6 6 Nevertheless, stable and effec-
tive public administration always accounts for private value in the
61. L. ROBBINS, THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE (1932), cited in A.
CoTRLL, supra note 59, at 1.
62. A. CorrRELi, supra note 59, at 3; T. TETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RE-
SOURCE ECONOMICS 17-19 (1984) (explaining that economic analyses can describe the human
relationship to the environment, considered an asset to which we ascribe value).
63. For example, Webster defines politics as "the total complex of relations between
people in society." WESTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 890 (5th ed. 1977). Similarly,
Black defines politics as "the science of government; the art or practice of administering
public affairs." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1043 (5th ed. 1979).
64. Developments in the philosophy of language indicate that terms derive meaning
from the context of their use in ordinary language rather than from some fixed definition.
See generally L. WrIrrGENsTEIN, THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS (2d ed. 1960); L. WrITTEN-
STEIN, PmLOSOPmCAL INVESTIGATIONS (3d ed. 1968); S. KIpKE, WrrrGENSTEIN ON RULES AND
PRrvATE LANGUAGE (1982). To this end, in the context of ordinary language, the term politics
includes the notion of endowing some with the power to decide how taxes (a resource) are
spent, who receives government assistance for food, shelter, and clothing, and generally, how
to divide among the public the benefits acquired by the entire society.
65. H. SPROUT. THE CONTEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLmCS 135 (1978).
66. As a simple example, the political allocation of clean water depends not so much
upon who values the water more, but upon which use of the water most efficiently benefits
the community. Thus, if X offers $1 per gallon for fresh water, and Y offers $2 per gallon, an
economic allocation dictates that Y receive the water. A political allocation, however consid-
ers the purpose for the water purchase. Hence, if Y plans to use the water to wash his car,
while X plans to irrigate crops used to feed the community, a political allocation may dic-
tate that X receive the water, though he pays less for it. See T. TIETENBERG, supra note 62,
at 178 (graphically describing the gap between private and social optima in recycling of
paper).
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endeavor to most efficiently allocate insufficient resources. 7 There-
fore, politics includes the concept of economics (especially distrib-
utive economics), and both politics and economics are inextricably
related to the resources available in our environment. 8
The Protocol will impact the econo-politics of the parties. One
need look no further than the wording of the agreement itself to
understand that the drafters of the Protocol intended to attack the
problem of CFC regulation from an economic perspective. The pre-
amble to the agreement, for example, specifically recalled Article
XIV of the Vienna Convention for Protection of the Ozone Layer
which laid the framework for the Protocol.8 That article called
upon all states and regional economic integration organizations to
control their emissions of CFCs by any means at their disposal,
including regulation of production and consumption." One provi-
sion of the Protocol attempts to enact the goal of regulation
through economic control by requiring reductions in production
and consumption, though providing exceptions for domestic needs
and industrial rationalization.7 Another portion of the Protocol
aims at economic regulation through control of trade in CFCs with
non-parties.7 ' And most significantly, the drafters of the Protocol
recognized the disparate impact that regulation of CFC industries
would impart on developing countries. The parties sought to mini-
mize the inequity of this economic disparity by entitling less devel-
oped countries to delayed compliance, transfers of technology from
developed countries, and economic incentives from developed
countries for use of new technologies.7 1
Regional economic integration organizations, production, con-
sumption, domestic needs, industrial rationalization, trade, eco-
nomic disparity, and economic incentives are concepts which play
67. Governments which fail to consider private value are unstable because their insensi-
tivity to the values of constituents leads to change of regime either through political process
or revolution.
68. One commentator notes that environmental politics evokes questions regarding
"who gets what, who pays, and who will suffer in consequence." In the quagmire of multiple
competing claims for insufficient resources "we see a prime example of the interrelatedness
that is an invariable element of the context of environmental politics." H. SPRouT, supra
note 65, at 154.
69. Vienna Convention, supra note 36, art. 15; Montreal Protocol, supra note 65,
preamble.
70. Id.
71. Id. art. 2, paras. 1-4.
72. Id. art. 4.
73. Id.
1990]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
a large role in the economic process. For example, production is an
important function in the determination of the price (value) of
goods on the market.7' Consumption plays a similar role in deter-
mining value. 75 Since economic theory analyzes the allocation of
scarce resources according to value, and production and consump-
tion impact the determination of value, CFC regulation must affect
the economies of the parties to the agreement. Indeed, because
ozone depletion is linked to CFC emissions, "the problem involves
economic and not just environmental concerns. 76
1. Economic Consequences of CFC Regulation
The Protocol will likely have three major economic conse-
quences. First, as regulation of CFCs under the Protocol requires
reduced production and consumption of the chemicals, the CFC
industries will no longer need to employ a sizeable work force.
Therefore, regulation under the Protocol will exacerbate unem-
ployment. This interpretation of the effects of the CFC regulation
was favored by such developed countries as Great Britain and
France. Prior to satellite confirmation of the alarming rate of ozone
deterioration, these countries ardently opposed any CFC regula-
tion for fear of increasing ever-rising levels of unemployment."'
The problem of job loss as connected to CFC regulation has a co-
rollary effect upon less developed countries where industry serves
as a means of creating jobs, income, aiid financial stability. Regula-
tion will at least partially prevent many less developed countries
from starting or continuing their industrialization process, and
74. The quantity of goods produced is one variable considered in determining the price
of a good. Assuming that demand for good X remains constant, the point where supply
intersects demand represents the value of X. As supply increases, price decreases, and as
supply decreases, price increases. This simplified explanation is a concept commonly re-
ferred to as the law of supply and demand. A. COTTRsLL, supra note 59, at 3-5.
75. Consumption serves to represent demand in the market just as production repre-
sents supply.
76. See Confronting the Threat, supra note 8, at 453.
77. Unemployment levels in France steadily increased from 5.2% in 1978 to 10.6% in
1987. The United Kingdom suffers similar difficulties, enduring unemployment increases
from 5.7% in 1978 to 11.9% in 1986. INT'L LABOR OFFica, YEARBOOK OF LAaoua STATISTICS
635, 639 (1988). Both countries also avoided regulation for fear of compromising their trade
position in the international marketplace. Comment, supra note 7, at 455. Others, however,
disagree that regulation will necessarily cause the loss of jobs. They argue that regulation
will spur new research and development efforts to discover alternative substances. Once
found, these new substances will be used in the same manner and require more personnel
for their manufacture. Under this view, regulation will actually create jobs for the scientists
needed to complete the research and development.
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thus, effectively deprive them of future jobs.""
Second, the price of CFC-produced goods will increase. Ac-
cording to the laws of supply and demand, as regulation on pro-
duction curbs the amount of CFC goods available in a market with
fixed or increasing demand for CFCs, the price increases as a re-
flection of the extra value people attach to scarce products.79 Some
might argue that increasing price hinges upon the assumption of
constant demand and that terms of the agreement take both sup-
ply and demand into account by regulating production and con-
sumption in tandem. Thus, as production decreases, and consump-
tion decreases, both the supply and demand for CFCs will change
simultaneously, causing price to remain constant. Nevertheless,
fixed demand for CFCs for the immediately foreseeable future is a
safe assumption in view of the fact that no alternative substances
for CFCs exist. While there is no guarantee that demand for CFC
products will remain fixed or increase indefinitely, the nonexis-
tence of suitable chemical equivalents strengthens the argument
that demand will at least remain constant in the foreseeable fu-
ture.80 Even if industry succeeds in discovering CFC substitutes,
the goods produced with these replacements will initially bear a
high cost. Industries now dependent on CFCs for production of
goods must pay for the transition from CFC based production to
the alternative methods. Of course, this cost of transition from one
mode of production to another ultimately impacts the consumer,
who will pay a higher price for the good in the market.8"
The extraterritorial effects of CFC consumption further ham-
per enforcement of the Protocol. In econo-political terms, the
seemingly free gifts of nature, like air, water, and ozone, have qual-
78. Former Indian Prime Minister Indira Ghandi appropriately expressed this corollary
concern when she stated, "Rich countries may look upon industrialization as the cause of
environment destruction, but to us it is one of the primary means of improving the environ-
ment of living.... How can we speak to those who live in villages and in slums about
keeping oceans, rivers, and air clean when their own lives are contaminated at the source?"
Struthers, The United Nations Environment Programme After a Decade: The Nairobi Ses-
sion of a Special Character, 12 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 269, 281 (1983), as quoted in A 200-
Point Ecology Plan Gains at U.N. Conference, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1972, at A12, ol. 3.
79. See supra notes 66, 67.
80. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. The assumption that demand will
remain fixed is supported by the fact that even if the United States is capable of limiting
demand, other countries with expanding industry and wealth have increasing demand for
CFC-dependant products. For example, the Peoples' Republic of China has expressed con-
cern over CFC regulation because current demand for refrigeration in that rapidly develop-
ing country requires the expansion of its CFC industry. See Nightline, supra note 35.
81. Comment, supra note 7, at 454.
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ity (i.e., the air is "clean," the water is "pure," the ozone is "suffi-
cient"). The quality of the resource gives the resource value. In
other words, pure water is worth more than contaminated water,
clean air is worth more than dirty air, and sufficient ozone is worth
more than insufficient ozone. The consumption of environmental
quality is called pollution. Pollution is objectionable because it in-
volves the inefficient use of a resource to which we attach value.82
In econo-political terms then, ozone is a scarce resource, and CFC
production constitutes pollution in that it destroys a valuable
resource.
In a world community where environmental quality is a scarce
resource but erroneously treated as free by one nation, the costs of
pollution are not borne by those responsible for it. Therefore, the
third economic consequence of the Protocol is that countries which
breach the agreement will not bear the true cost of the devastation
caused by CFC production. Rather, that portion of the population
which inhabits the contaminated environment ultimately bears the
cost of CFC pollution, while the offending countries continue to
seek optimum economic activity based upon their inevitably
smaller private costs.
8 3
The international "free rider" problem is not easily dismissed
in a world of sovereign states. State sovereignty, a basic tenet of
international law, prevents an international body from forcibly
compelling a nation to comply with agreements.8 The very notion
of sovereignty ensures that each nation will act in its own best in-
terest, even when such action constitutes a breach of a prior agree-
ment.85 Thus, in the pragmatist's discourse, all action by states
82. A. COTTRELL, supra note 59, at 39.
83. Id. at 44. See also Smith, The United Nations and the Environment: Sometimes a
Great Notion?, 19 TEx. INT'L L. J. 335, 337 (1984) (arguing that many member states of the
U.N. Environment Programme refuse to take responsibility for their environmental errors,
and instead seek compensation from other states for their errors); cf. Comment, Deforesta-
tion in Brazil: Domestic Political Imperative-Global Disaster, 18 ENVT'L L. REP. 536, 570
(1988) (concluding that the vast extraterritorial benefits derived from the Amazon rain for-
ests by the international community warrants the international community paying for their
preservation) [hereinafter Deforestation in Brazil].
84. See W. GORMLEY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENT. THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION 58 (1976). Some commentators contend that sovereignty poses an almost in-
surmountable hurdle to international cooperation, allowing states to act within their juris-
diction in a manner which affects adversely areas beyond their borders "subject only to
fragmented and primitive values of international responsibility." A. SPRINGER, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW Op POLLUTION: PROTECTING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT IN A WORLD OF SOVEREIGN
STATES 31 (1983).
85. Here, "best interest" includes a balancing of the costs and benefits of breaching the
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may be reduced to what each country perceives as its most benefi-
cial course of conduct."
By attempting to regulate globally CFCs through economic
means, the international community apparently demands that less
developed countries forego their own best interest in favor of larger
societal interests by limiting the standard of living increases asso-
ciated with industrialization.8 7 The already difficult problem of en-
forcement in this context expands geometrically when accounting
for conflicting definitions of "need"88 in a world of sovereign states.
International enforcement of a Protocol with massive economic
consequences, especially for less developed countries, is therefore
unlikely.
2. Political Consequences of CFC Regulation
These three major economic effects for parties to the Protocol
will cause national and international political repercussions be-
cause CFC industries have a vested interest in keeping their unreg-
ulated products on the market. 9 For example, one political conse-
agreement. For less developed countries, the cost is bound to be lower than the benefit of
continuing to support CFC industries. The weapons which the international community
might employ to enforce the Protocol on breaching countries are economic pressure and
diplomatic negotiations. Yet in the delicate world of international agreements, the contem-
plated methods of enforcement are purposely weakly crafted in order to persuade the most
countries possible to join the agreement. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. Interna-
tional law is not coercive like law in the domestic context. Rather than wielding force, inter-
national law is more a means of predicting reactions and positioning of alliances. See A.
Swan & J. Murphy, The Regulation of International Business and Economic Relations 119,
128, 148 (1988 ed.) (unpublished manuscript).
86. The Melian Debate, recorded by Thucydides in 416 B.C. provides a classic example
of "interest politics." In the great wars between Athens and Sparta in 431-404 B.C., Melos, a
small neutral island, became the object of Athenian imperialism. Athenian generals offered
the Melian people their lives in return for their enslavement. The Melians, however, coun-
tered that the virtues of a free life dictated that if pressed, they must fight a losing war
against the Athenians. In the course of the ensuing dialogue, the Athenians argued that
"into the question of human affairs the question of justice only enters where there is equal
power to enforce it, and that the powerful grasp what they can, and the weak grant what
they must." THUCYDIDES, The Peloponnesian Wars, in THE GREEK HISTORIAN: THE Com-
PLM & UNABRIDGED HISTORCAL WORKS OF THUCYDIDES (B. Jowett trans. 1942); see also M.
SMALL & J. SINGER, INTERNATIONAL WAR 128 (1985).
87. E. DALE, JR., THE ECONOMICS OF POLLUTION, THE POLITICS OF NEGLECT 224 (1971).
The aforementioned statement of former Indian Prime Minister Indira Ghandi (supra note
78) buttresses the view that domestic imperatives will likely outweigh any economic sanc-
tions the international community impose against violating countries. See generally Defor-
estation in Brazil, supra note 83 (arguing that domestic necessities require Brazil to plun-
der the Amazon for its economic value at the cost of global environmental security).
88. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
89. Comment, supra note 7, at 454.
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quence of the regulations which impinge upon this vested interest
in the United States was the formation of the Alliance for a Re-
sponsible CFC Policy in 1980. This well-funded and highly organ-
ized group lobbied United States Congressmen in an effort to per-
suade them that the connection between CFCs and ozone
deterioration was too tenuous to justify regulation of the billion
dollar CFC industry. 0 Similarly, the abstention from agreement by
the Soviet Union at the London Conference on Ozone Protection is
a recent international political consequence of CFC regulation.
Many cite the inclusion of a major CFC production facility in its
five-year plan as the chief explanation for Moscow's hesitation to
join the agreement."'
In third world countries, the political consequences of regula-
tion are likely to be more severe. In countries struggling to extri-
cate their people from the squalor of peasant life, present tangible
problems take precedence over future intangible dilemmas. 2 Third
world leaders understandably contend that wealthy nations like
the United States can easily afford to look beyond their immediate
necessities to the problems of tomorrow. Poorer countries, how-
ever, bear the burden of more pressing imperatives.9
Developing nations face the predicament of attempting to bal-
ance local political needs with disastrous global environmental con-
sequences. Brazil's destruction of the Amazon rain forest poign-
antly illustrates this conflict between domestic political necessity
and global environmental imperative. The Amazon, a large, unset-
tled portion of Brazil extremely rich in resources, has long been
90. Hoppe, supra note 17, at 113; see also supra note 17 and accompanying text
(describing the industry position on regulation of CFCs).
91. Nightline, supra note 35.
92. Comment, supra note 7, at 454.
93. The Bangladeshi Representative attending the 1977 meeting of the United Nations
Environment Programmes Governing Counsel explained, "To us the controversy over harm
caused to the ozone layer . . . is simply not relevant. Increasing soil productivity, coping
with natural disasters, and meeting basic human shelter needs are the areas in which the
country should concentrate." See A. SPRINGER, supra note 84, at 23.
Vermont Governor Madeline Kunin, Chairperson of the National Governor's Associa-
tion Committee on Energy and Environment, expressed similar political concerns in a dif-
ferent context. While Vermont remains a paragon of environmental activism (for example,
by introduction of the Third Century Trust, which includes legislation prohibiting the in-
stallment of air-conditioners in cars sold in Vermont), Governor Kunin explained: "It's a lot
easier to talk about this globally than to act locally. People say all the right things, but when
it comes to their own back yards, it's very tough." Kurtz, Environmentalist Governor Bat-
tles Her Natural Allies, Miami Herald, Dec. 31, 1989, at A23.
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the target of grand development schemes 4 to benefit a perpetually
struggling domestic economy, alleviate a crushing foreign debt
problem, and ameliorate the seething social and political pressures
of the landless poor."
With the realization that rapid exploitation of resources fos-
ters immediate economic development, recent Brazilian govern-
ments facilitated deforestation, road building, land settlement, and
timber harvesting programs. 8 The resulting devastation9 7 has vast
extra-territorial environmental effects.9s Yet, the long-term inter-
national effects of "pillaging the forest environment mean little to
masses of people facing starvation, or to governments faced with
staggering foreign debt, great income disparities among their peo-
ple, and an intense desire to modernize."" Rather, the seething
econo-political pressures within Brazil force policy-makers to view
deforestation and its consequences as "progress."
Less developed countries faced with industrial opportunity
through CFC production confront the same dilemma. In the hard
currency of interest politics, immediate tangible domestic needs in-
94. These development schemes generally sought a rapid development of Brazilian hin-
terlands, with rapid settlement and exploitation of western territories. See H. RODRIGUEZ,
THE BRAziLL4NS: THEIm CHARACTER AND ASPIRATIONS 79-80 (1967). These plans called for the
construction of the 5000 kilometer TransAmazon Highway. As part of the construction plan,
the Brazilian Government set aside 100 kilometers on either side of the highway for farming
and large scale logging and cattle operations. Deforestation in Brazil, supra note 83, at 542.
Further, to stimulate public and private sector investment in development of the Amazon,
the Brazilian Government enacted Operations Amazonia and Polamazonia, which en-
couraged development through large land concessions coordinated with construction of Am-
azonian infrastructure. Id. at 541-43.
95. Deforestation in Brazil, supra note 83, at 538.
96. Id. at 570. As one Brazilian Congressman declared, "The green area of the Amazon
should be totally devastated ... because the forest represents the paralyzation of the coun-
try's development." Id. at 537.
97. The amount of deforestation is greatly disputed. Some naturalists estimate that
only a 1.2% reduction in forest size took place in 1980. White, Nature's Dwindling
Treasures, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Jan. 1983, at 2, 33. Estimates are imprecise but range as high
as a 25% reduction in forest size which occurred as early as 1978. D. MAHAR, FRoN'ra
DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN BRAzu.: A STUDY OF AmAZONIA 126 (1979). Notwithstanding the dis-
pute over the degree of devastation, observers generally agree that the rate of deforestation
is increasing. See Grainger, The State of the World's Tropical Rain Forests, 10 ECOLOGIST
6, 47 (1980).
98. For example, the rain forest produces two-thirds of the world's fresh water. Total
destruction of the forest will result in a global draught. Further, the forest acts as a climato-
logical moderator. Destruction of the forest will affect adversely global weather patterns.
Finally, countless species of animal and plant thrive only in the Amazon. Destruction of the
rain forest will lead directly to their extinction. Deforestation in Brazil, supra note 83, at
537.
99. Id. at 569.
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evitably outweigh future intangible international consequences.
With regulation of CFCs, "the political choice of strategy is af-
fected by considerations of national economic advantage and dis-
advantage."' 0 0 While countries may agree upon elimination of non-
essential uses of CFCs, the precise definition of the term "non-es-
sential"10' points up the Protocol's enforceability problems. In-
deed, in the Third World, CFC production may well prove essen-
tial to political stability or economic growth.
B. A Moralistic Approach to Regulating CFCs
Contrary to the Protocol, numerous international agreements
are enforceable currently based on moral concerns despite the im-
pediment of sovereignty."' For example, as a reaction to its vast
experience with wars, and fearing that "what we conveniently call
inhumanity is simply humanity under pressure,"' 3 the interna-
tional community slowly forged an area of international criminal
law specifically aimed at wartime activities. Notably, the practices
of the Nazis attempt during World War II to eliminate entire
groups of people raised questions of whether such destruction con-
stituted crimes against humanity.' °4 In the aftermath of the Holo-
caust, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted
Resolution 96 (I),105 condemning genocide as a crime under inter-
national law. Passage of Resolution 96 (I) eventually led to the
drafting and passage of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.' 0 6 The Convention defined
100. Johnston, supra note 7, at 264. See supra notes 93 & 94 and accompanying text.
101. An analogous undefined term from the Protocol itself is "domestic needs." See
supra note 44.
102. See generally J. BARROS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 379 (1974). Note
that these agreements deal with subjects ranging from forbidden types of weaponry to the
protection of certain species of animals. Cf. The Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539, 1 Bevans 631; Treaty
for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972, 29 U.S.T. 441, T.I.A.S. 8826.
103. M. WALZF_, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 4 (1977). International criminal law on war-
time behavior provides a salient example of moral regulation in spite of sovereignty for two
reasons. First, wartime is when states act in their most sovereign capacity. Second, interna-
tional agreements regarding wartime behavior demonstrate the power of moral regulation
because wars often evince people's most immoral behavior. If the global community can
enforce moral agreements upon states during wartime, then certainly, that same community
may enforce international laws regarding less morally problematic topics like environmental
protection.
104. G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONs 303 (5th ed. 1986).
105. This resolution was adopted December 11, 1946.
106. G.A. Res. 260, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), reprinted in 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 7-10
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genocide as any act committed with intent to destroy a national,
ethnic, racial, or religious group.10 7 Article V of the Convention
provides for enforcement of the criminal laws of the international
community against offending parties. 108 Further, Article VI specifi-
cally states that persons charged with the crime of genocide are to
be tried by a competent tribunal of the state in which the act was
committed or by such international penal tribunal as may have
jurisdiction. 'I
Why were the countries that signed the Convention willing to
yield some of their sovereignty in favor of an international criminal
law? Isolating the distinctive feature of the Convention which
makes it enforceable and applying that feature to international en-
vironmental law may lead to greater enforceability of the Montreal
Protocol.
Enforceable international agreements which criminalize cer-
tain acts possess one common element-they rely upon moral
rather than economic considerations. As a result, the international
consensus against genocide facilitated both its criminalization and
the enforceability of the Genocide Convention. In fact, the perma-
nent and pervasive element of all criminal law is its moral ground-
ing.110 According to the late sociologist Emile Durkheim, "crime
(1951)(doc. supp.).
107. Id. art. Il.
108. Id. art. V.
109. Id. art. VI; G. VON GLAHN, supra note 104, at 304. Other war crimes include using
poisoned weapons, firing on undefended localities, firing on a flag of truce, poisoning
streams and wells, killing military personnel who have surrendered, killing or attacking
harmless civilians, attacking h6spitals, torture, and inhuman treatment of prisoners. Id. at
774-75.
110. E. DURKHEIM, THE DviSION OF LABOR IN SocIrTY 71 (1933). By morality, I mean
not that which is moral or right in the objective sense, but that which seems right to the
members of a society. Various definitions of morality in different contexts exist. Neverthe-
less, in the realm of law, at least one commentator follows Durkheim and suggests the possi-
bility of interpreting moral to mean the general consensual morality of a particular commu-
nity. Welch, The State as Purveyor of Morality, 56 GEO. WASH. L. Rzv. 540, 545 (1988). As
demonstrated by the extraterritorial effects of environmental problems (see supra note 23
and accompanying text), all sovereign states are considered members of the same global
community. Most principles of international law have their roots in this type of morality.
For example, the Corfu Channel case, (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 34, established the inter-
national legal principle that countries ought not act within their own jurisdictions in a man-
ner which effects other sovereign nations adversely. This internationally recognized "moral"
rule already serves as the guiding principle for much international environmental law. Com-
ment, supra note 7, at 440.
Other principles regarding the preservation of environment for the enjoyment of future
generations may one day serve as the moral basis for the criminalization of environmental
abuse. See T. O'Riordan, Advocating the Rights and Interests of Future Generations, in
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shocks sentiments which for a given social system are found in all
healthy consciences.""1 Though we remain incapable of drawing a
complete list of the sentiments which individuals of a society
share, the most deeply ingrained sentiments are known and shared
by all." 2 Crime is an affront to the totality of beliefs common to
average citizens of the same society.1 s Therefore, because laws re-
sult from choices about values a community chooses to espouse
and goals it deems important to pursue, morality serves as a source
of law.1 " Extending the above principles to an environmental con-
text, it appears that the key to enforcing international environ-
mental agreements is criminalizing specific environmental abuses.
Such a move, however, depends upon enormous change in world
consciousness. Nevertheless, such a change in world perception
may be evolving. For example, statistical evidence supports this
trend. Data collected between 1978 and 1984 indicates that Ameri-
cans had strong views on environmental issues, even when required
to choose between clear environment and economic trade-offs."16
Other polls indicate that "public support for environmental pro-
tection remains high and has not declined" in spite of recent dete-
riorating economic conditions.,
The Montreal Protocol itself is another example of this moral
change. Regardless of the economic means chosen to regulate and
alleviate the problem of ozone depletion, the fact that the Protocol
attempts to address the problem at all demonstrates that contin-
ued decimation of the ozone is a problem which the international
community is morally bound to rectify. The Protocol, though act-
ing in economic terms, reflects the greater moral value which the
global community places on environmental quality, and ultimately,
on self-preservation.
The disagreement over the means to protect the environment,
rather than the demonstration of the absence of moral agreement,
DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REsouRcF POLICY 419 (Schnaiberg, Watts &
Zimmerman eds. 1986).
111. E. DuRKHEIM, supra note 110, at 73.
112. Id. at 74.
113. Id. at 79. "An act is criminal when it offends strong and defined states of the
collective conscience." Id. at 81.
114. Welch, supra note 110, at 545.
115. D. Morrison, How and Why Environmental Consciousness Has Trickled Down, in
DISTRMUTIONAL CONFLICTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REsouRcE POLICY (Schnaiberg, Watts & Zim-
merman eds. 1986).
116. Id. at 197. The study reaching this conclusion was conducted by Lowe, Pinhey,
and Grimes in 1980 utilizing national longitudinal data (1973-78).
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underlines the moral common ground shared by those engaged in
the debate. Few people disagree on the morality of protecting the
environment. 1 ' People argue about how to save the environment,
or how to prevent ozone depletion, but not about whether they
ought to protect the environment. The dialogue concerning the
method of protection employed lies moot absent the prior moral
agreement that environmental protection is necessary.
Post materialist politics in the United States and Western Eu-
rope also indicate change in world perception concerning the envi-
ronment. This "new politics" presents an ideological counterthrust
to the values of industrial society. It questions the belief inherent
in industrial society that economic growth is the best means to se-
cure social progress."1 ' Post materialism posits the impossibility of
maintaining economic growth without ultimately and irreversibly
damaging the environment, thus leading to a decline in the quality
of life. Rather than contesting the benefits of economic growth,
post materialism recognizes that growth causes deleterious side ef-
fects in environmental quality which outweigh those benefits."'
Thus, it is no accident that ecologists spearhead the post material
political movement."'
The media, another indicator of public concerns, is replete
with other less esoteric examples of the greater moral value now
117. In response to environmental dilemmas, many 20th Century environmentalists at-
tempted to formulate a philosophy articulating a defense of the environment. These philoso-
phies included the notion that humanity's "best interest" (i.e., survival or quality of life) lies
in preservation. For example, Burton MacKaye argued that the humans exhibit bi-polar
gregariousness and solitary characters which are best satiated through access to wilderness.
B. MAcKAYE, LIVING WILDERNESS 4 (1939). See also H.D. THOREAU, WALDEN (1961)(on the
human need to blend civilization and wilderness). Others argued for preservation of the
environment for future generations. See T. O'Riordan, supra note 110; J. Feinberg, The
Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations, in PHILOSOPHY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 43
(1974). Still others argue that wilderness, and the environment by extension, has a right to
exist for its own sake, regardless of whether humanity values it. See A. WHITEHEAD. THE
CONCE'r OF NATURE (1920); K. Simonsen, The Value of Wilderness, 3 ENVIRoNMENTAL ETH-
ics 259 (1981).
118. See G. SmrrH, POLITICS IN WESTERN EUROPE 36 (4th ed. 1984). In the United
States, post materialism and cries for economic reform became popular near the end of the
1960s. However, amid rising standards of living and population growth which contributed to
the pollution problem, reform became a lost cause. See W. O'NEILL, COMING APART. AN IN-
FORMAL HISTORY OF AMERICA IN TH 1960s 422 (1971). Thus, it remained exceedingly difficult
politically to enact environmental legislation because it would ultimately diminish personal
income. After all, the high costs of pollution abatement would be paid for, if at all, through
increased prices and taxes. Id.
119. See W. CHAFE & H. STIKOFF, A HISTORY OF OUR TIME 367 (1983).
120. See G. SMITH, supra note 118, at 36.
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placed on the environment. Advertisements,'21 political cam-
paigns,12 and various current events documented by the media122
all demonstrate the popularity of the idea of environmental protec-
tion. Ecologically and environmentally oriented business ventures
offer final evidence of a massive change in attitude towards the
environment. Popular environmental concerns led entrepreneurs to
invest in "clean up" organizations for solid waste and hazardous
waste treatment, analytical, consulting, and engineering firms,
equipment suppliers, and recyclers to name a few.' Indeed, the
environment has become the "people's cause. '"25
Awareness of the value of environmental quality is not a
change in perception which will occur in short course. Neverthe-
less, current attitudes towards the environment are significantly
different from those common during the time of Lewis Cass and
George Gilmer. 1 2  This growing international consensus, like the
international outrage toward the act of genocide, may ultimately
serve as the moral basis for criminal rather than economic sanc-
tions for environmental abuse.
Therefore, a moralistic approach to enforcement of environ-
mental agreements envisions an international community which
avoids the problems associated with attempts at environmental
protection through economic regulation. Instead, enforcement of
121. For example, Time Magazine recently published a 12-page special advertisement
from Volvo extolling the ecologic virtues of its automobiles and its corporate commitment to
a "green future." TIME, Nov. 27, 1989, Special Advertising Section.
122. During his campaign for the Presidency, George Bush garnered much public sup-
port by declaring himself the "environment President." Krog, Bush v. Dukakis v. Environ-
ment, Miami Herald, Sept. 5, 1988, at 21A.
123. For example, medical waste washing ashore on the United States East Coast
forged a "marked shift in public attitudes about environmental crimes," causing prosecutors
to crackdown on corporate polluters. Marcotte, Crackdown on Polluters, ABA J., May 1989,
at 36. The Exxon Valdez disaster, where an Exxon oil tanker spilled 11 million gallons of oil
into Alaska's ecologically vulnerable Prince William Sound, rallied yet another shift in pub-
lic perception. According to one article, many Alaskans inherently suspect the oil industry,
and enforce previously ignored laws requiring tankers to file emergency spill clean up plans
before entering Alaskan ports. N.Y. Times Service, Alaskans Shift Gears About Oil, Miami
Herald, June 3, 1989, at 6A. See also Beck & Hager, Buried Alive-The Garbage Glut: An
Environmental Crisis Reaches Our Doorstep, NEWSWFEK, Nov. 27, 1989, at 66.
124. Ames, Cleaning Up, Miami Herald, Nov. 20, 1989, Bus. Monday, at 1. According
to some experts, environmental services is a classic growth industry, with a 20% to 25%
annual growth rate, reaching a volume of $108 billion by 1992. Id. at 14.
125. See Cousteau, At Last Environment Has Become the People's Cause, Miami Her-
aid, Nov. 27, 1989, at 15A. According to Cousteau, leaders who ignore the upswell in concern
for the environment do so at their peril, for "environmentalism is becoming the domain of
the many." Id.
126. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
OZONE DEPLETION CRISIS
environmental treaties occurs through criminal sanctions imposed
by member states which reflect moral outrage at environmental
abuse. In order to facilitate the psychological change required for
criminalization of environmental abuse, the international commu-
nity must seek to develop a moral consensus through a public
awareness campaign as contemplated by the Protocol.' For with-
out the development of a collective consciousness which abhors en-
vironmental destruction, criminalization, and thus enforcement of
environmental agreements, will be baseless.
IV. CONCLUSION
CFCs are rapidly depleting the stratospheric ozone layer,
Earth's only protection from the deleterious effects of ultraviolet
solar radiation. The international community reacted to the global
threat of ozone deterioration by enacting the Montreal Protocol.
The Protocol attempts to protect the ozone layer from CFCs by
regulating their production, consumption, and trade. Enforcement
of environmental agreements between sovereign states based upon
economic regulation is difficult because of the inherent connection
between environment, economics, and politics. Because for Third
World countries the econo-political benefits attendant to CFC pro-
duction outweigh the cost of the economic sanctions suffered under
international pressure, many less developed countries with imme-
diate domestic econo-political priorities which supersede the future
intangible international environmental consequences of ozone de-
terioration may breach the agreement with relative impunity. Exci-
sion of the ozone crisis from the econo-political realm, and reloca-
tion of the dilemma within the parameters of moral discourse may
provide one solution to the inexorable problem of enforcement.
The world community may enforce future environmental agree-
ments more effectively with criminal sanctions based upon the
moral imperatives reflected in our ever-developing collective
consciousness.
MICHAEL DAVID EHRENSTEIN*
127. International organizations are best positioned to further beneficially alter our en-
vironmental attitude. Recognizing the importance of public perception for effective enforce-
ment of the agreement, the Protocol called for international cooperation in public education
regarding the causes and effects of ozone deterioration. See supra note 52 and accompany-
ing text.
* J.D., University of Miami School of Law. Another version of this article won the Uni-
versity of Miami School of Law Award in the Roscoe B. Hogan Environmental Law Essay
Contest.
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